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The Mask and Agamben: the Transitional 
Juridical Technics of Legal Relation
Connal Parsley1
Italian theorist Giorgio Agamben is well known for his complex 
critique of the institution and praxis of thought in the west, and in 
particular for taking aim at a constellation of ontologico-political 
structures denoted by the term ‘ juridical’. Within this endeavour, 
Agamben provides a critique of the metaphysical subject and of the 
related notion of the person. Specifically, for Agamben the figure of 
the human is structured and produced by the dignitas: the image or 
mask which bridges the juridical, moral or ‘natural’ person, and the 
condition of their appearance within law and political life. As he wrote 
in a recent collection of essays: ‘Persona originally means “mask” and 
it is through the mask that the individual acquires a role and a social 
identity’ (2009c: 71). The tradition of thinking the person from the 
direction of the mask and its categories of appearance is a long one, 
and it is marked by a tightly sedimented correlation between these 
two senses — metaphysical-moral and politico-juridical — of the 
‘person’. Within that tradition, the mask or persona is a technic — a 
device, dispositif or apparatus — through which a juridical relation 
to life comes to be engendered.2 For example, in Roberto Esposito’s 
terms, the generalisation of the metaphysics of the ‘person’ means 
nothing less than the ‘ juridical governability of becoming in its norms 
and exceptions’ (Esposito 1999: 240).3 Rather than address the many 
strands and variegations of this rich and complex tradition, and rather 
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than trace either Agamben’s broader stance on government, juridicality 
and life or its interaction with his specific development of Foucault’s 
term dispositif,4 in this brief article my interest is in identifying and 
establishing something quite specific about Giorgio Agamben’s strategy 
for thinking the person as a mask.
In order to do this, I argue that in Hobbes — a key referent in 
Agamben’s account of political power’s relation to life — the (political) 
mask, with its antecedent in Cicero’s theatrical metaphor, is an essential, 
indeed indispensable element of an account of political representation: 
a device which always mediates a rhetorically foregrounded natural 
life through and against the realm of human (political) artifice. 
Many authors have attempted to cultivate a non-theatrical or non-
representational register of the political in response to this feature of 
contemporary political discourse.5 I would suggest that Agamben is 
among them. But perhaps surprisingly, Agamben — despite famously 
critiquing Hobbes’ representative politics and sovereign power, and 
the notion of natural life which belongs to and sustains it — cannot be 
said to negate the politico-legal technic of the mask/persona outright. I 
argue that Agamben instead effects a delicate separation of the juridical 
relation from the specific, material technics which precede and facilitate 
it — the same technics which provide it with its ‘origin’6 — ultimately 
using a transformed or ‘perfected’ version of that legal technic against 
juridical relations. In this case, I will argue that Agamben refines the 
tradition of thinking the person as a mask, a species of image, and, 
resisting its substantialisation in the moral person, deploys it against 
the image/substance caesura of modern politics.
Of Persons, Authors, and Things Personated
In the Leviathan, for the first time in his theory of government, Thomas 
Hobbes introduces a discussion of the nature of the political person. 
Hitherto framing the political covenant according to a relatively 
mechanistic operation of exchange — an agreement to subject oneself 
and to relinquish rights (Skinner 2005: 168) — in Leviathan, Hobbes 
deploys a vocabulary of author and authorisation, representative and 
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representation, person and personation (Hobbes 1968: 217-22). Hobbes’ 
discussion constitutes a critically significant intertwining of the two 
major dimensions of the modern political person: on the one hand, the 
juridical, ethical self capable of covenanting, authoring, authorising, 
and of holding property (Hobbes 1968: 218); and on the other, that 
self ’s ‘outward appearance’ — the visible, countable entity which is 
necessary to the formation of ‘the Representative’ and, more specifically, 
to the accountancy of affirmative and negative voices by which its will 
is determined (Hobbes 1968: 221).
For Hobbes, the category ‘person’ serves as the mediation and 
relation between these two poles, and his notion of the person is strongly 
influenced by Cicero’s parallel between speaking or acting for another, 
and the actor’s ‘bearing’ or ‘sustaining’ a mask or persona which had, 
by the early Middle Ages, already become a standard sense of the term 
repraesentare. As Hobbes sets out:
The word Person is latine: instead whereof the Greeks have 
πρóσωπον, which signifies the Face, as Persona in latine signifies the 
disguise, or outward appearance of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and 
sometimes more particularly that part of it, which disguiseth the face, 
as a Mask or Visard: And from the Stage, hath been translated to any 
Representer of speech and action, as well as in Tribunalls, as Theatres. 
So that a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the stage and in 
common Conversation; and to Personate, is to Act¸  or Represent himselfe, 
or an other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or 
act in his name; (in which sence Cicero useth it … (Hobbes 1968: 217).
Hobbes cultivates his category of the person through the technical 
device of the mask which, by an application of Cicero’s parallel between 
the theatrical stage and the tribunal, serves as well for portraying 
someone’s appearance as it does for speaking in their name. The mask 
thus generalises the phenomena of personation, acting, and representation 
across the theatrical and legal scenes. In fact, it is the discussion of these 
processes in Hobbes’ chapter, ‘Of PERSONS, AUTHORS, and things 
personated ’, that grounds the very juridical notion of the authoring/
authorising person, the covenanting individual, and the nature of 
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ownership in general. What must therefore be grasped in Hobbes’ 
discussion of representation and the person is that it establishes an 
indissoluble relation between the creation of a fictional representation, 
to which is attributed a Leviathan’s power, and the juridical notions of 
the person in relation to authorship and authority. The mask or ‘persona’, 
as an avowed ‘Fiction’ of political appearance, is the practical image-
technic which comes to emblematise a juridical relation in mediating 
between an abstract, political metaphor of organisation on the one 
hand, and a notion of nature and the natural person on the other — 
thus enabling the former on the basis of the latter.
Hobbes’ account of the person, it is sometimes noted, works with 
a relatively stable and atomistic, and certainly pre-social, notion of the 
individual. The idea of an individual agent who acts self-interestedly, 
guided into a social and political covenant by fear and self-preservation, 
implies in Hobbes an individualist distinction of self from social or 
political role (Hollis 1985: 226). In order to show that this is entirely 
consistent with a political self which is understood as inseparable from 
the technical fiction of the mask, I intend to describe in some detail of the 
tradition of thinking the mask and the social self together in a persona.
Πρóσωπον, Persona, Person
Marcel Mauss, commenting that the Schools of Athens and Rhodes 
had tremendous influence on Latin moral thought, remarks that 
πρóσωπον did indeed quite precisely translate as persona — and that 
in Latin the term retains the seemingly paradoxical duality which is 
of interest to us here. This duality consists in its meaning as a ‘mask’ 
and, at the same time, as the character each individual ‘is and aspires 
to be’. As he wrote:
The word πρóσωπον is extended to the individual, with his nature 
laid bare and every mask torn away, and, nevertheless, there is retained 
the sense of the artificial: the sense of what is the innermost nature 
of this ‘person’ (personne), and the sense of what is the ‘role-player’ 
(personnage) (Mauss 1985: 18).
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This fundamental confusion can be seen in greater detail in one of 
the best-known texts from the classical tradition, Cicero’s De Officiis. 
In this case, it takes the form of an inability to articulate a set of ethical 
requirements or duties without recourse to the notion of a personal 
image of virtue. The problem goes far beyond the fact that the ethicality 
of character or action is, in Cicero, far from absolute — referable almost 
entirely to one’s role and status. Rather, virtue itself appears to have the 
very form of an image or the presentation of a ‘face’. According to the 
strict relation in Cicero between personae and ‘mere images of virtue 
[simulacra virtutis]’ (Burchell 1998:114), it appears to be enough for 
Cicero to ‘represent’ or ‘act’ a virtuous part and be seen to be performing 
it. But it must be noted that this is not tantamount to a cynical politico-
theatrical performance by an otherwise coherently separable (im)moral 
actor because, as Burchell remarks, ‘it is far from clear that Cicero would 
be able to make sense of this kind of distinction’ (1998: 116). The very 
notion of an individual’s nature underlying their public acts is defined 
only through further embedded gradations of the persona. Specifically, 
Cicero remarks that like actors, we must each undertake the difficult 
tasks of evaluating our natures, impulses and talents and matching them 
to the most appropriate persona in the interests of creating a seemly 
‘evenness’ which serves an ideal of civil decorum:
Cicero’s invocation of ‘one’s own nature’ is not so much an observation 
of ‘personality’ as an invocation of the ethical notion of ‘character’ 
familiar from the Greco-Roman stage, from whence the term persona 
had emerged into wider usage (Burchell 1998: 111-12).
Here, the ‘nature’ of one’s character, lurking beneath the social 
presentation of a seemly self, is defined only by further reference to 
a visible, demonstrable and performable self endowed with specific 
theatrical character-features like ‘wit’ or ‘patience’ (Burchell 1998: 
112-13).
Despite its service within a different political context, a similar 
primacy of the representation (and concomitant indistinction between 
the ‘artificial’ and the ‘natural’ person) can be found in Hobbes’ 
Leviathan. In fact, the personated entity is presented in Hobbes as the 
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very principle of a confusion between the natural person and the human 
capacity for art or artifice. Leviathan opens with the proclamation that 
‘Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governes the World) is 
by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, 
that it can make an Artificial Animal’ (Hobbes 1968: 81). Offering 
nature itself as species of art, Hobbes prepares the ground for the feat 
of politically natural representation he was about to unfold. And when 
it comes to Hobbes’ explicit claims about the mask and the persona, 
he makes no material distinction between presenting oneself ‘Truly’, 
or representing someone else, ‘by Fiction’ (1986: 217): a point which 
did not escape the notice of Hannah Pitkin in her classic study (1967: 
19). In either of these cases, the theatrical mask, inherited from Cicero, 
enables Hobbes to make no distinction between ‘Natural ’ and ‘Artificial ’ 
personhood. In fact, in the quotation above, Hobbes installs the 
primacy of ‘disguise’ and ‘outward appearance’ into his every notion of 
the person, whether in artificial or natural conversation — concluding, 
as he does, that ‘a Person is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage 
and in common Conversation’. Further, he affirms that to ‘Personate is 
to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other, and he that acteth another, is 
said to beare his Person’ (1998: 217). To the lack of distinction between 
conversation and staged speech, we may therefore add an indifference 
to ‘acting’ or ‘representing’ oneself or another: in each case, what is 
primary is the mask of personhood which must undoubtedly be worn 
in order to appear and to figure in the political landscape; and it is to 
this mask that juridical rights accrue (see Pitkin 1967: 19). It is this 
same precondition, when read with Hobbes’ collocated discussion of 
the principle of author and authority (with its Roman and Christian 
antecedents), which enables not just the ability, but precisely the author-
ity to handle the juridical and covenanting self — whether one’s own 
or that of another. That is, the very juridical and ‘substantial’ self is 
expressed as a species of persona: mask, image, artifice, representation.
This dependence of the substantial on the technical is less surprising 
than it might seem. In fact, Hobbes’ pre-social atomistic individual 
owes a great deal, in the first place, to the notion of the ‘moral person’ 
fashioned by Christianity — a person posited, as Marcel Mauss said in 
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a famous essay (relying on Schlossman), as a ‘metaphysical entity’ and, 
eventually, a sacred and inalienable core of personhood (Mauss 1985: 
19, 22). However, the origins of this entity are to be found in none 
other than the very notion of the ‘mask’ which is at issue. As Giorgio 
Agamben notes, referring to Boethius (who knowingly ‘hypostasised’ 
and substantialised the theatrical sense of the persona), the Church 
Fathers’ theologico-metaphysical notion of person rested on the very 
basis of a ‘double semantic heredity of the term “person”, which … 
signifies both “mask” and juridico-moral “personality”’ (Agamben 
1996: 18).
This originary confusion, which enabled the stabilisation of a 
metaphysical personhood, can therefore be seen as a co-implication 
of ‘nature’ (or the natural) and the ‘artificial’, to the point where it is 
impossible to rigorously separate them. This problematic co-implication, 
present in the Greek notion of πρóσωπον, remains operative not only 
in the reception of the Greek into the Latin persona, but also, I argue, 
in the subsequently crafted juridical self of modern political theology 
— and certainly in Hobbes’ Leviathan. And it is to Agamben’s response 
to this co-implication that I turn presently.
Before doing so, it is necessary to make one further note about 
Hobbes’ person in order to make clear the political horizon of this 
co-implicative structure. It concerns the essentiality of representation, 
or a ‘vicariousness’ to that notion of the person, which was invested 
deeply in both Hobbes’ view of the political person and his project 
for its organisation. Since, in Hobbes, personation itself is acting for 
or representing ‘the self or another’, the vicariousness that comes to 
structure the authority and appearance of identity is permitted to 
permeate the structure of the political self itself. This representative 
mechanism is absolutely necessary to Hobbes’ treatise, as it is only 
because of the primariness of the representability of the self (over 
the substance that is represented) that the Leviathan may have 
one of its most distinguishing and, at the same time, controversial 
features: it is a single ‘personified’ figure and not a parliamentary body 
corresponding proportionately to a populace (see Skinner 2005: 173; 
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Schmitt 1996a: 32-4; and Gamboni’s (2005) discussion of composite 
images). Thus the Leviathan’s legitimacy, and even possibility, rests for 
Hobbes on this feature. The ‘natural’ identity which is pre-supposed 
by Hobbes’ structure, therefore, entertains a difficult relation with its 
own representation; fundamentally ranked behind ‘representativeness’ 
(Skinner 2005: 173), but essential to it in rhetorically guaranteeing its 
authority.
The political problem of representation has received many and 
varying treatments — especially within critical twentieth century 
thought of Modernity7 — and, within this history, the work of Hobbes 
in particular (which Esposito has said ‘opens the history of radical 
imminence’ (1999: 82)) has left much to be discussed.8 Even though, 
as Pitkin’s analysis shows, the problem of representation requires the 
careful itemisation of its various senses and difficulties; and even though 
any detailed consideration of the nature and problem of representation 
cannot help but encompass countless other thematics; I wish to take 
up only a specific aspect of its legacy. It is an aspect that belongs to 
many traditions of juridical thought, not specifically to Hobbes, and it 
is more visible than ever in contemporary legal discourses of the person 
in general. I refer to the fact that just as in Hobbes the natural political 
personality is modelled on and pre-supposed by the artificial devices of 
its representation, so too does the same structure (a primary positivity 
or representation supported by a pre-supposed and supposedly pre-
existing personal entity) characterise law’s person. It is useful to reiterate 
this apparently trivial point — often made, for example, regarding the 
nature of the disembodied corporation — because of the radicality of 
the critique to which, I will now suggest, it is subjected by Giorgio 
Agamben.9 I therefore note, briefly, a basic feature of modern thought 
of the legal person which traces this Hobbesian pattern. While all 
moderns might agree with Richard Tur’s Kelsenian suggestion that ‘[i]
f legal personality is the legal capacity to bear rights and duties, then it 
is itself an artificial creation of the law’ (Tur 1987: 121); with the result 
that personality is determinative of the exercise of and participation 
in legal power; it is also the case that such a formal entity presupposes 
a relation to an independently existing life. This life, however, takes 
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the form of a consistent juridical entity also called the ‘person’ which, 
whether or not recognised as ‘moral’ as such, is certainly a stable 
metaphysical entity whose juridicality is again being reaffirmed by its 
endowment with natural rights (with or without legal recognition). 
Further, it is frequently supposed that such a personated life is prior 
to its reflection by the formal technics of the law (the opposite, based 
on our discussion above, is historically the case).10
Legal discourse is structured according to a positive and formal 
mask of personality that nevertheless relies upon the image of a ‘flesh 
and blood’ natural life (potentially ‘without law’) which underlies and 
animates it. No clearer example could be found than this emblematic 
quotation from John Thomas Noonan’s (1976) Persons and Masks of 
the Law which, while acknowledging the absolute prevalence of the 
fictions of legal personality, fantasises about an underlying natural 
reality without law:
In the making of masks lawyers have let their fiction-making capacity 
run amok ... masks are monsters as dangerous as those issuing from 
the sleep of rational rule. Masks are a type of ‘human self-alienation’. 
Masks conceal persons. To remove the masks is to distinguish between 
them and the persons. By the latter I mean particular flesh and blood 
and consciousness (Noonan 1976: 26).
The great variety of positions on the legal subject may emphasise 
either the formal features of the legal subject or a natural personal 
substance (or ‘reasonable person’) lying under or within it (see, for 
example, Naffine 2003; Davies and Naffine 2001). But, in fact, both of 
these positions remain complicit in the tradition of the person which 
begins with the mask but in doing so posits that the mask is borne by 
some real-life wearer — precisely the point against which Agamben’s 
analysis strikes.
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Imago Sacer
I have noted that Agamben is concerned to critique the juridical person 
pre-supposed by the tradition I have outlined here. But leaving aside 
for a moment the critical interventions of his project, it is useful to 
briefly establish the role of the political mask or persona within the 
descriptive and diagnostic dimension of his writing. I argue that 
Agamben identifies a primacy of the personal political appearance of 
Hobbesian heritage (although he does so, as will be seen shortly, in 
order to overcome the constitutive presupposition of nature which it 
necessitates). There is perhaps no clearer example of Agamben’s account 
of the importance of the persona as a political mask or imago than the 
crucial passage of Homo Sacer (1995) in which Agamben discusses 
Kantorowicz’s famous thesis of the ‘King’s Two Bodies’ (Agamben 
1995: 91-103). As useful and important as Kantorowicz’s work is for 
our understanding of the dual nature of political personality and the 
function of the image in political theology generally (see particularly 
Kantorowicz 1946, 1957), my intention here is not to extol the 
indispensability to political theology of the person-as-image generally; 
but rather to identify the specific and unusual approach Agamben 
takes to it. I therefore read Agamben’s discussion, which emphasises a 
fundamental similarity between the apotheosis of the Roman emperors 
and Kantorowicz’s description of the funeral rites of French kings, as 
notable for two principal reasons, which I will address in turn.
Firstly, it is striking that in Agamben’s analysis it is precisely 
the image of the King or Emperor, theatrically tended and given 
ritual burial, that is the unifying, politically significant element in 
both the Roman and French instances of the drama of maintaining 
perpetual sovereign power. Agamben, insisting that ‘what is decisive 
for understanding the whole ritual is precisely the function and nature 
of the image’ (1995: 95), argues that the:
… macabre and grotesque rite in which an image was first treated as a 
living person and then solemnly burned gestured ... toward a darker and 
more uncertain zone ... in which the political body of the king seemed 
to approximate — and even to become indistinguishable from — the 
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body of homo sacer, which can be killed but not sacrificed (1995: 94).
What turns out to constitute the hinge between the central, originary 
relation at stake in Homo Sacer — the fundamental relation between 
sovereignty and the sacredness of a bare political life conditioning every 
political subjectivity — is nothing other than the public or political 
body, which has the form of an image. After considering the funereal 
mask, Agamben demonstrates the commonality to all political power 
of this technic or device by showing that is it in fact the image of the 
devotus (a citizen or warrior consecrated to the gods) that is the sacrally 
and politically active ingredient.  Initially suggesting that an analogy 
between the devotus and homo sacer seems only superficial (consisting 
in their being both consecrated to death and thus belonging to the 
gods), Agamben again presses home a closer relation, this time to be 
found in Livy. And again, it is the image as public and sacred persona 
which constitutes the parallel:
If the man who has been consecrated dies, it is deemed that all is well; 
but if he does not die, then an image [signum] of him must be buried 
seven feet or more under the ground and a victim must be immolated 
in expiation. And no Roman magistrate may walk over the ground in 
which the image has been buried. But if he has consecrated himself 
... and if he does not die, he cannot perform any rite, either public or 
private (Livy, in Agamben 1995: 97).
According to the guiding principles of Livy’s remark, it is the 
representation, the image or likeness of the body (it does not matter 
whether living or dead), which is the part of us ‘subject’ to political 
power and is, as Agamben says, consecrated to death, separated from the 
‘living’ (1995: 100). Since sacred life is ‘isolated in the image’ (1995: 101), 
the ‘bare life’ to which that image referred or represented is permitted 
to live on, invisibly to the gods, without the mask that guarantees it a 
place in political life, sacral efficacy, community, power and genealogy. 
It is therefore possible to remark that there could be no ‘bare life’ in 
Agamben’s book without this technic of the mask or the image; in its 
various historical iterations as the wax figure, the colossus, the ‘double’, 
the statue, the funereal image or doll, the larvae or, as I will discuss 
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shortly, the dignitas. It is the generalised logic of these chronologically 
disparate material political techniques which, for Agamben, ‘seems to 
unite, in one constellation, the body of the sovereign and the body of 
the devotee’ (1995: 97).
The second decisive aspect of this passage is that this discussion 
occurs in the context of an attempt to correct a perplexing omission 
in the work of both Kantorowicz and, subsequently, his pupil Gisey, 
on a matter with direct bearing on the broader question of the relation 
between theology and politics. Whereas scholars had overtly related 
the Roman precedent to the French funeral rites, Kantorowicz excludes 
this possibility for the purpose, Agamben maintains, of preserving his 
‘thesis concerning “Christian political theology”’ (Agamben 1995:94). 
Of course, it is important to Agamben to establish in Homo Sacer the 
generalisability of the sacred relation inherent in sovereign political 
power. This is an organising contention which receives important 
updates in more recent writings, such as the conviction that the 
secularised world does not escape the theological but bears its mark 
(Agamben 2009a: 76), and that the sacred relation survives this process 
and must be ‘profaned’ rather than simply secularised (see Agamben 
2007a). Absolutely critical to grasp in this regard is that, for Agamben, 
it is none other than the image-mask which coheres this possibility; 
and in his subsequent revisions of Kantorowicz’s thesis, for example 
in State of Exception and Il Regno e la Gloria, this aspect is emphasised 
in different idioms. In the former, Agamben explains that it is only 
because the King’s power was so bound to his person or personality (as 
auctoritas, distinct from potestas), that the need arose to preserve it in a 
dignitas or image that does not die (‘dignitas non moratur’) (Agamben 
2005a: 83); even going so far as to declare that dignitas is ‘simply a 
synonym for auctoritas’ (2005a: 83). And in the latter, Agamben revisits 
Kantorowicz’s (1946) claims in order to declare that the glorification of 
power, achieved through its depiction and liturgical acclamation (this, 
too, with its origins in a pagan equivalent), has a constitutive and not 
merely descriptive function in maintaining the life of perpetual and 
absolute power. Thus, Agamben is able to situate glorification effected 
through depiction and acclamation as ‘more originary — or rather, 
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more decisive — than the distinction between theology and politics, 
spiritual or profane power’, it being, rather, the praxis and the empty, 
bodiless clothing ‘in which they coincide’ (Agamben 2007b: 215).
Therefore, for Agamben, the image-mask is a critical hinge in 
his description of the symbology of perpetual and absolute sovereign 
power: it not only coordinates the relation between sovereign and sacred 
body, but it also constitutes the tie uniting diverse historical epochs 
which are characterised by otherwise different forms of power. That 
is, the cipher of the ‘mask’ bears immanently within it a specific form 
of political relation which would need to be ‘profaned’ rather than 
simply secularised.
Dignitas
A brief mention of Agamben’s most frequently deployed determination 
of the political persona, the dignitas, will help us to more overtly 
connect Agamben’s handling of that person to the tradition which, I 
have suggested, is compressed into Hobbes’ Leviathan. What is at stake 
is the certainty that, for Agamben, the notion of the external, visible 
political self is not merely some technical legal exercise that facilitates 
formal or procedural relations. For Agamben, who despite striking 
against juridico-normativity in its most pervasive forms concerns 
himself so very rarely with any strictly so-called ‘legal’ phenomena and 
positivities, it is the very institution and tradition of thought, rather than 
a positively distinct entity ‘law’, which above all accommodates and 
organises the sacro-juridical logics he targets.11 This complex idea has 
an easily comprehensible consequence for my discussion here.
The mask of personhood carries within it a responsibility that is 
both moral and juridical (Agamben 2009c: 80). Simply, it is not strictly 
necessary to address a ‘properly legal’ account of legal personality 
in order to find a juridically structured person, since the mask of 
personhood itself is a device which immanently bears with it a juridical 
caesura and relation. This can be seen antonomastically in his account 
of the notion of dignitas which, as in the traditions with which the first 
25
The Mask and Agamben
part of this paper are concerned, does not permit an easy separation 
between the natural person and a political artifice of personhood. For 
example, in Remnants of Auschwitz, in the course of his suggestion that 
existing concepts of ethics (and ‘dignity’) are fundamentally juridical 
in nature, Agamben traces dignitas through Roman public law’s notion 
of rank and ‘external appearance’, through its spiritualisation by moral 
philosophy, to the point where it is made to function coterminously with 
the juridical person and the very figure of the human (Agamben 2002: 
66-9). And, as I mentioned above, Agamben’s decisive handling of the 
distinction between the powers of auctoritas and potestas characterises 
the former as coterminous with dignitas.
This pervasiveness of the (fleshed) person by the original mask-
structure means that what is clearly present within Agamben’s account 
is the continual identification of a theological caesura, rather than a 
simple difference, between the natural and political person. As he writes 
in The End of the Poem, after remarking on the dual sense of ‘person’ as 
both ‘theatrical mask’ and ‘moral personality’; ‘after the Fall, person and 
nature remain — tragically or comically — divided and will coincide 
again on the “last day” of the resurrection of the flesh’ (Agamben 
1996: 19). But this is no simple division or separation. The subject 
of Agamben’s critique is a double gesture which stabilises throughout 
the Western tradition of theologico-philosophical constructions 
of the person. This gesture consists on the one hand of creating a 
parallel between the theatrical and the juridical, and arguing for 
their conflation; and on the other, in doing so, maintaining a division 
between the persona and the natura which is presupposed as the natural 
substance to which it attaches, a double gesture which founds both 
the juridical and moral person together (see Agamben, 2009c: 72). 
The Church Fathers’ establishment of the metaphysical person on the 
notion of the mask was, after all, reliant on reference to a ‘natura that 
is its subiecta and without which it cannot subsist’ (Agamben 1999: 19).
The history of the metaphor of the mask thus engenders the split 
in the modern subject, with a specific consequence for the figuration 
of a natural life said to underlie it. Glossed in Remnants of Auschwitz 
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as the ‘simultaneous separation and unity of dignity and its bodily 
bearer’ (Agamben 2002: 67), the ‘person’ is complicit in producing and 
maintaining the spectre of a nature, hiding behind the mask of nomos, 
without which the theatre of valid power would be ineffective. As such, 
what is operative here is the further specification of the problem of 
bare life: the natural life that is produced by the political relation and 
bound to it, but separated from it by a caesura (see Agamben 1995).
The Mask and Non-Representational Politics
In order to appreciate the subtlety of the critical move Agamben makes 
in response to this diagnosis, it is useful to note Hollis’ affirmation with 
regard to the status of the mask as persona in Hobbes. Hollis (1985) 
remarks that the so-called natural core, the ‘actor’ themselves behind 
the mask, if there is one, is utterly inaccessible since the mask comes 
to stand in for the totality of the social, the system, the public, and 
everything legitimate. What results for Hollis is a ‘Hobbesian core so 
private and so much at a distance from its public, legitimating masks 
that the real man is impenetrable, it vanishes from scientific enquiry’ 
(Hollis 1985: 227). And it is this feature to which Agamben directs 
his now very familiar discussion in Homo Sacer: for example, when he 
says that ‘the state of nature is ... not truly external to nomos but rather 
contains its virtuality’ (Agamben 1995: 35). This aspect of Agamben’s 
critique of the caesura within juridical thought is extremely important. 
It relates to another key strand in the introductory passages of Homo 
Sacer, namely, the notion that just as law presupposes ‘life’ or ‘nature’, 
so too ‘language presupposes the non-linguistic as that with which it 
must maintain itself in a virtual relation’ (1995: 20); thus giving rise to 
the negative metaphysics which binds language to death and placemarks 
the subject’s separation from (and within) historical time.
Although structurally delicate, the departure of Agamben’s critical 
project from Hobbes’ political one is abrupt. It must be recalled that 
what was primary for Hobbes was the deployment of the technic 
device of the mask as the cipher of a split between a person’s external, 
representable political identity, and its ultimately unrepresentable natural 
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centre. And further, that it is precisely this split which enables the 
political mechanism of the Leviathan to function. The technic of the 
mask is clearly oriented in Hobbes towards the establishment of a 
politically perpetual and absolute sovereign power, and for that reason 
it must constitute a dangerous device for Agamben, whose critical 
project aims not only to critique that power, but also to articulate the 
conditions of the thought, possibility and politicality of its overcoming. 
This commitment, like almost all important aspects of Agamben’s work, 
undergoes many iterations across disciplinary terrains — beginning 
with the critique of language and negative metaphysics in Language and 
Death (1991) and Infancy and History (2007c). While this problematic 
cannot be discussed in any detail here, the argument I offer regarding 
Agamben’s approach to the ‘mask’ is an example (rather than an 
explanation) of Agamben’s particular non-representational approach. 
In order to grasp this argument it is worth recalling Agamben’s attempt 
to articulate a conception of politics that does not entail a notion of 
representation.12 In The Coming Community (1993a) and Means Without 
End (2000) particularly, Agamben affirms that to found a community 
on the ‘representable’ predicates of its members (members hitherto split 
by the caesura seen in Hobbes) only ensures the political community’s 
constitution by a negative and exclusionary semiotic logic of difference 
and similitude which does not address the originary human ethos and 
capacity for politics. Agamben, therefore, emphasises the need for a 
non-identitarian political belonging or community and attempts to 
articulate politics as a question of our ability to ‘form a community 
without claiming an identity’, thus affirming that ‘human beings co-
belong without a representable condition of belonging’.
For these reasons, it is perhaps surprising to read Agamben’s account 
of the legacy of comedy left to Italian culture by Dante in The End of the 
Poem (1996), which was published after Homo Sacer and only a couple 
of years before Remnants of Auschwitz’s account of dignitas, person, and 
the theatrical mask. It is there that Agamben outlines the Stoic critique 
of tragedy and remarks that, for the Stoics, only a truly tragic person 
would make the error of confusing themselves, their identity, with the 
mask they have been assigned by fate. As he describes, for Epictetus 
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‘the wise man is instead the one who, accepting without discussion 
whatever “mask” has been assigned to him by fate, represents his part 
and thereby refuses to identify with it’ (Agamben 1999: 17-18). A basis 
for virtue in Stoic thought thus emerges from the acceptance of one’s 
‘role’ and, at the same time, the holding apart of one’s natural person 
(however conceived) from the political person (see Agamben 2009c: 
73). But however logical and tempting it might seem, on the basis of 
Agamben’s thoroughgoing critique of the confusion of artifice and 
nature in Hobbes, it must not be supposed that Agamben endorses 
this ‘holding apart’ in an attempt to mirror the Stoics’ safe and cynical 
distance from the technic of the mask. The Stoic position does not 
neutralise (or ‘profane’) the technic at issue. On the contrary, it was 
only because of this distance that something like a moral personality 
could emerge, a category which Agamben regards as the ‘power that 
furnishes criteria for action and that remains superior to all the possible 
acts it can produce’ (1999: 18). For Agamben, a conscious, cynical, 
Stoic distance from the mask (dependent as it must be on precisely 
the institution of thought which is pervaded by a juridical heritage) 
is only emblematic of the two poles of that moral personhood — a 
personhood which was always constituted ‘through an adhesion, and 
at the same time, a disjuncture with respect to the social mask’ (2009c: 
73). In fact, I will now argue that Agamben ought to be regarded as 
undertaking the gesture precisely opposing that of the Stoics; which 
is to say, paradoxically not negating, nor taking a distance from, the 
very technic of the mask which enabled the formation of the juridical 
person to begin with.
‘Be only your face’
First of all, it is instructive to look at the fate which Agamben allocates 
to dignitas in the ‘camp’. Since, as is well-known, the camp is for 
Agamben the paradigmatic example of the coextensivity of the juridical 
norm with modern political space, the fate of dignitas in the camp is 
significant for Agamben’s approach to it generally. Whereas dignitas, as 
we have seen, borrows the foundational metaphor of a mask concealing 
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a separate natural person and incorporates it as a spectral faultline in 
modern ethical subjectivity, Agamben argues that this binds the moral 
notion of human dignity to an external political appearance and a 
concomitantly structured (and presupposed) ‘humanness’. So, according 
to Agamben, everything resembling ‘human dignity’ as a ‘humane’ and 
‘dignified’ treatment and experience of the person is precisely what is 
lost (and yet ‘witnessed’) in Auschwitz. As he remarks, in a manner 
which clearly poses a bond between the thought of ethical standards and 
the thought and positivity of normative juridical structures, ‘Auschwitz 
marks the end and the ruin of every ethics of dignity and conformity to 
a norm’ (2002: 69). As such, for Agamben, any ‘good’ that the camp’s 
survivors are able to ‘save from the camp’ is ‘therefore not dignity’. It 
must not be thought, however, that the loss of the image of dignity 
means that there is revealed a true kernel of natural life underneath. 
Such a life is only the bare life that dignity creates, which is structured 
and implicated, as we have seen, juridically. What is at stake is actually 
the disappearance of both this figure of bare life and dignity together:
… in extreme situations ... it is not possible to maintain even the 
slightest distance between real person and model, between life and 
norm. And this is not because life or the norm, the internal or the external, 
in turn takes the upper hand. It is rather because they are inseparable 
at every point (Agamben 2002: 69, italics added).
The fusion of juridico-normal and personal life — and of everything 
internal (unrepresentable) and external (predicable), at the moment of 
its terrible and perfect fusion — consumes the image-dignitas which 
created the poles of its caesura and is converted into a ‘form-of-life’. 
For this reason, as well as being a destruction of all notions structuring 
ethical life as hitherto thought, it is also a kind of new and uncertain 
possible ground for an ethical life conceived apart from dignitas, which 
Agamben suggests would be the precondition of a more originary 
human ethos and political existence (Agamben 2002: 69). While 
Agamben’s account of the possibility of this non-juridical ethical life 
is well known, my particular concern is to demonstrate that it consists 
precisely in the possibility of this fusion (not separation) of appearance 
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and person; politico-legal mask and natural being. I therefore turn to 
key moments within his work where such a fusion is attempted.
Chief among these is found in Means Without End (2000), in which 
Agamben’s essay on ‘the face’ (which was originally published in the 
same year as Homo Sacer) presents, I argue, an attempt to disable the 
juridical (and Hobbesian) ‘personal’ split between the internal and 
external;13 a communicable, representable, social and external image-
identity on the one hand, and an unsayable, unrepresentable, private, 
natural and internal self on the other (Agamben 2000: 91-100). In 
arguing that the face is actually only the cipher of the appropriation 
of the living being by means of (juridical) language, Agamben casts 
the face as at once a kind of extreme ‘zero-point’ of the capture and 
presupposition of the natural being by the linguistic structures of 
signification and, at the same time, a potentially transformative 
exposure of that process. Thus, the face, the appearance of the person, 
functions as an ambivalent location for two paradigms of politics. And 
for Agamben, this exposure to language and to politics is capable of 
engendering a political life more originary than one premised on any 
representable predicate within our identities — a basis critiqued also in 
The Coming Community (see Agamben 1993a: 1). As he remarks, ‘that 
which in single individuals opens up to the political is the tragicomedy 
of truth’ (2000: 91).
This reference to the tragic and comic masks is not trivial.  It 
was always the mask that coordinated the external-internal caesura 
between persona and natura which marks representable-unrepresentable 
personated life; and the face (since every identity is for Agamben a 
mask) is also the threshold between these two poles. This very threshold 
is the point of collapse between personated and natural life; the point 
at which one’s internal qualities or ‘predicates’ interface with the world; 
the ‘threshold of de-propriation and of de-identification of all manners 
and of all qualities — a threshold in which only the latter become purely 
communicable’ (Agamben 2000: 100). This is why he exhorts us to 
dwell, somehow, where nothing in us can be predicated: ‘Be only your 
face,’ he writes, ‘Go to the threshold. Do not remain the subjects of 
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your properties or faculties, do not stay beneath them: rather, go with 
them, in them, beyond them’ (Agamben 2000: 100).
Agamben therefore begins from the point, which we identified 
in Hobbes, of a primary confusion between nature and art, between 
the guise and the disguise; between the genuine person and the 
artificial or represented one. But whereas Hobbes, pursuing a politics 
of representation, could at no cost follow through on the potential 
erasure of the object of representation — the ‘natural self ’ or ‘natural 
life’ which is necessary to make sense of and validate the economy of 
representations — Agamben undertakes precisely this move. Whereas 
the modern positivist conception of the subject, however formal, 
repeats the gesture of a separation between mask and wearer, image 
and natural referent, Agamben – passing through that conception – 
attempts their dissolution. The problem with the instituted juridical 
metaphor of the mask, Agamben seems to suggest, is precisely that 
it is only metaphorical, thus concealing the fact that the mask, the 
appearance, is the only self.
What I wish to suggest is that Agamben’s strategy — rather than 
insisting on the sanctity of a space away from representability — is 
to ‘appropriate this appropriation’ and situate life within it, thus 
engendering a genuine inseparability of person and appearance, inside 
and outside, in which a person is only their face, only their mask, only 
their image.
Ruin: Perfection / Collapse
If the mask has served as the cipher of a subject split between an 
external, social and political self and a presupposed internal, natural 
substance (bare life), and if that split becomes a practically invisible 
caesura guaranteeing a politicality premised on representation and 
representability, then I suggest that Agamben’s strategy is to work 
towards the perfection of the mask technic, so that any underlying natural 
substance may no longer be separated from the mask or political imago. 
And if Hobbes had proposed an indistinction between the artifice and 
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naturalness of the human which guaranteed the primacy of political 
representation, then Agamben emphasises that indistinction to its ‘zero 
degree’, to the point of the wholesale preclusion of the ‘natural’ which 
inheres in the duality of that distinction. This of course would amount 
to the overcoming of the very possibility of a public and private sphere, 
which is the aim of Agamben’s notion of a ‘form-of-life’ as a ‘being 
that is only its own bare existence and ... being only its form, remains 
inseparable from it’ (Agamben 1995: 188). This undoubtedly means, 
for Agamben, that a thoroughgoing critique of political representation 
is one in which natural life and its ‘representation’ are inseparable, 
collapsed into a ‘form’. What begins to ‘disappear’ in Hollis’ Hobbes are 
not the techniques and modes of appearance, but the ‘natural substance’ 
which Agamben argues is actually already invisible, intangible, ‘pre-
supposed’ and, in fact, produced by normative and juridical processes. 
Agamben pursues this disappearance, actively arguing for the de-
substantialisation of the person and its transformation into, precisely, 
a species of image (see ‘Special Being’ in Profanations (2007a)), as the 
legal subject is, imperfectly, already.
This de-substantialisation reaches an apotheosis in the new technics 
of the person as biometric image. Agamben’s recent discussion of 
biometrics proposes that such new technologies radically alter the 
basis on which we are known socially: no longer through a function 
of the persona, but rather on the basis of an image of something purely 
biological (which corresponds to the making of bare life itself into the 
political subject) (2009c: 77). Pursuing the evolution of the political 
person along an inarrestibly governmental trajectory of political power, 
Agamben suggests that the latest biometric technics of identity produce 
an ‘identity without person’ (2009c: 79).
Just as it did in Auschwitz, for Agamben modern politics ushers 
in the destruction of the person and, along with it, ‘the space of ethics 
of which we were used to conceiving’, which now ‘loses its sense and 
must be re-thought from the very beginning’ (2009c: 79-80). But 
importantly, for Agamben this destruction is also a ‘liberation from 
the weight of the person’ (80) and the juridico-morality of its brand 
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of ethics. As such, this destruction offers a kind of escape from law’s 
juridicality towards an uncertain and inexorable future which is, 
for now, governmental in nature. It is through this future, not in its 
resistance, that the liberation from ‘personal’ ethics lies. Consistently 
with Agamben’s well-known political stance on the politics of the 
spectacle and expropriation (see Agamben 2000), he suggests that 
since these governmental technics offer no means of return from this 
condition, ‘we must prepare ourselves without hope nor recrimination 
for the search beyond both personal identity and identity without 
persona’ (82). As such, it is my argument that Agamben’s approach is 
distinct from both contemporary moral philosophical discourses which 
attempt to revive an ethical possibility by ‘deepening the self ’,14 and 
critical legal approaches which would attempt to resist the artificiality 
of the legal person — or reinvest its responsibility — by thinking it 
from the direction of the flesh.15
It is difficult to disagree with the idea that Agamben’s political 
project (which aims to critique the very ‘power for action’ as riddled 
with juridicality) disables, displaces, or even critiques the kind of 
concrete political ‘action for change’ that typically passes for political 
engagement. Certainly his work is deliberately without something 
like a positive political program. But by foregrounding the question 
of Agamben’s orientation to the specific material technics of thought 
that are at stake in rethinking the political, it is possible to understand 
something like a strategy which he puts into play. Specifically, if I am 
correct that Agamben’s work paradoxically perfects the representation 
of the person effected by the mask-metaphor, thus becoming syncretic 
with the natural person and disabling the possibility of the ‘separation’, 
presupposition, representation of that naturalness, then what we must 
be prepared to identify in Agamben is actually the delicate achievement 
of a new separation. Not, this time, of the person’s externalities from 
its presupposed internal life; but, rather, of the juridical relation from 
the specific legal technics which engendered it in the first place — a 
separation that enables the pitting of the latter against the former.
The perfection of the legal technic of the political image-person 
34
Parsley
against its tradition is also, actually, an attempt to ‘hollow out’ the 
juridical thought-institution that supports it, thus effecting its collapse. 
Perfection and collapse, perfection and ruin: the ruin of law’s traditions 
is for Agamben something that comes into view only in the very 
moment of their zenith, the era of the nomos of the earth in which the 
most imperfect formalisation of the person is in effect.
It would therefore be distinctly possible to view Agamben’s 
separation of juridical thought from law, in his treatment of the 
juridical technic of the mask, as a concrete example of the enigmatic 
notion of ‘neutralizing the partitions of the law’ which he finds in St 
Paul (Agamben 2005b: 48). Here on the fundamental ground of the 
political category of the person, I argue that Agamben attempts the 
perfection and collapse of that juridical person by means of a new 
use of its very own technic of the mask, as refined and pushed to an 
extreme by modern law. Agamben’s further, extreme development of 
this structure bequeathed by law attempts to effect the conditions for 
a fulfilment of the legal tradition. Which is to say, he attempts both 
to fulfil law and set it aside, and thus ruin it, rendering it inoperative.
Notes
1 The author would like to thank Marett Leiboff for her voice, flexibility, 
patience and encouragement, Shaun McVeigh for forcing upon me the 
weight of tradition, Timothy Campbell for useful reference suggestions on 
an earlier version, two anonymous referees for their helpful remarks, Peter 
Rush, and Annee Lawrence. Of course, all errors, strategic miscalculations, 
and many omissions, remain mine.
2 Perhaps the most urgent reference for such a reading would be Roberto 
Esposito’s (2007) Terza Persona: Politica della vita e filosofia dell ’impersonale, 
which poses the ‘person’ as a dispositif which organises and limits life, 
but also the much earlier Categorie dell ’Impolitico (1999), as Timothy 
Campbell’s explanatory essay suggests. Campbell’s (2008) essay also 
highlights the significance to Esposito of the contemporary philosophy of 
technics, through interpretations of Heidegger (most notably by Bernard 
Stiegler, in Technics and Time, through Rousseau rather than Hobbes, both 
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of whom are united in Categorie dell ’Impolitico). It is in this sense that I 
use the word ‘technic’.
3 A similar orientation can be found in Agamben’s investigation of Foucault’s 
term dispositif (see Agamben 2009b) especially taken in conjunction with 
the extended analysis of the oikonomia of government in Il Regno e la Gloria.
4 As does Nicholas Heron in his essay ‘The Ungovernable’ (forthcoming 
2011)
5 This is a guiding aim of Esposito’s Categorie dell ’Impolitico; but see also 
Carlo Galli’s discussion of Jean-Luc Nancy in Spazi Politici (163-4).
6 See Campbell 2008: 3
7 For an indication of the depth, breadth and significance of these, see 
Esposito’s Categorie dell ’Impolitico (1999) which handles in detail many 
of the twentieth century’s most important considerations of the political 
problem of representation, with particular reference to the German 
Catholic tradition.
8 For discussions and considerations of Hobbes’ political philosophy of 
representation, see Skinner (2005), Schmitt (1996a) and to a less direct 
but equally thematically powerful extent (1996b), Pitkin (1967), and on 
Schmitt’s theory of representation, taking in his reading of Hobbes, Kelly 
(2004), as well as Esposito (1999).
9 While I address this question here only in terms of Agamben’s strategy 
for approaching the ‘person’, the general problem of overcoming the 
presuppositional structure of language and politics is an old and germane 
question in Agamben’s work. See the essays on language in Agamben 
(1999) and Daniel Heller-Roazen’s introduction to that volume.
10 For a very different (liberal humanist) approach which nevertheless traces 
law’s function in cohering the human person through biological and 
symbolic dimensions, see Supiot (2007).
11 The title of the Italian volume of essays roughly equivalent to Potentialities 
emblematises this point: La Potenza del Pensiero (The Power of Thought). 
While this idea is taken up and developed in many ways within Agamben’s 
work, a useful summary of its application here may be borrowed from Alex 
Murray and Thanos Zartaloudis’ introduction, itself titled ‘The Power of 
Thought’, to a recent edition of Law and Critique: ‘One of the key problems 
in legal theories of late modernity … is the juridification of thought as 
such. In such juridification the model of thought becomes judgment and 
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a legal understanding of responsibility’ (2009: 208). One of Agamben’s 
concerns is to demonstrate the capture of thought within a negatively 
grounded metaphysical structure and corresponding condition of language 
of which, we could say, ‘law’ is perhaps best conceived as a symptom.
12 A specific gesture in response to the notion of representation can be said to 
stabilise throughout Agamben’s work, and the argument I offer in this paper 
is an example rather than an explanation of it. An important iteration of it 
comes from the introduction to Stanzas (1993b), where Agamben construes 
the implicit Platonic split between poetry and philosophy as meaning that 
‘poetry possesses its object without knowing while philosophy knows its 
object without possessing it’. Posing Benjaminian ‘criticism’ against these 
options, Agamben says that the critic ‘neither represents nor knows, but 
knows the representation’ (xvii). This culminates in Stanzas in a critique 
and displacement of signification, which demarcates an important but far 
from unique or isolated topos of Agamben’s reconfiguration of the question 
of representation (a current which runs through all of Agamben’s works 
without exception).
13 It is a striking feature of even — or especially — the most sophisticated 
accounts of legal subjectivity from more or less within the legal academy, 
that what is continually at issue is the possibility, and specific manner, of 
accounting for or mediating the relation between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
of the subject as a species of mask. See, for example, Goodrich (1991).
14 See Haines (1998)
15 For an interesting and erudite approach in this vein, and a different use 
of Agamben, see Mohr (2007) and Mohr (2008).
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